- Related Stories
-
Meteorologists call for better storm tech
September 20, 2005 -
FCC examines Katrina disaster response
September 15, 2005 -
Senators request $5 billion for emergency networks
September 14, 2005
The call now is for the federal government to develop a comprehensive, interoperable emergency communications plan and to provision that plan with equipment. The goal must be true interoperability across the full spectrum of voice and data communications alternatives.
When most of the legislators and government planners speak of such a network, they are generally talking about radio--that most basic communications technology that allows first responders and others to talk with each other, if not with other agencies, during an emergency. There is no doubt that radio is a vital tool and that much work will have to go into clearing spectrum and coordinating bands in order to make that system more efficient.
Our group, the Emergency Interoperability Consortium (EIC), is working not only to raise the visibility of the issue, but in a more fundamental sense, is working to make sure that those networks work to the greatest benefit of all.
We do that by advocating open standards for emergency data communications. While it may not sound at all sexy, the fact is that doing this can improve the efficiency of emergency response and save lives at a fraction of the costs of building new networks.
The goal of our work is to make certain that agencies and institutions that currently can't communicate with each other will be able to do so in an information-rich environment. One way to do that is through use of the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP), a standard developed by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) Emergency Management Technical Committee. CAP provides a simple and standardized format for exchanging alerts and warnings over various types of networks. This standard provides a simple and standardized format for exchanging alerts and warnings over various types of networks.
The National Weather Service now offers a CAP version of its weather warnings; the U.S. Geological Survey is incorporating it into warnings for earthquakes, volcanoes and wild fires. The Bush Administration has said all agencies must become CAP-compliant, and the Department of Homeland Security has endorsed the open-standards efforts.
When fully implemented, CAP will allow one data center--say, a police department--to alert both a fire department and a local hospital about an emergency. The newest version, CAP 1.1, is nearing completion and will add even more information to the structured warnings, including visuals. Other elements are being drawn up as well, including a part of the message that will allow responders to send out requests for what types of equipment are needed, as well as more sophisticated data sets targeting the right people in the right places.
This data can be delivered over any kind of network--a fiber optics network, if that's available, or conceivably a hastily constructed Wi-Fi network--to different types of receiving devices, not only to laptops. Because of the open standards, different companies and agencies will be able to tailor their own needs to their own products while still maintaining communications with others.
We hope that as policymakers move forward to investigate and to finance new emergency networks, they will look not only to radio, but also to the vast possibilities that harnessing data communications will provide. In that vein, open standards may represent the fastest, cheapest and most self-sustaining investment that the government can make to ensure that first responders and those they serve get the information they require when and how they need it.
Biography
Matt Walton is chairman of the Emergency Interoperability Consortium. Elysa Jones is engineering program manager for Warning Systems and is chairwoman of the OASIS Emergency Management Technical Committee.
See more CNET content tagged:
data communication,
warning,
emergency,
Hurricane Katrina,
agency
We do well to recognize that and ensure that the mission critical systems degrade gracefully. I don't disagree with the authors of this article. I say take it a step at a time and beware of too much hype about future systems when the disasters are happening now.
This is ever more important TODAY given that reprogramming of Federal and State funds is imminent in the face of handling debts incurred by ongoing war and unforeseen catastrophes at home. It's that or taxes. My bet is on reprogramming. The first thing to go will be soft targets such as standards initiatives; so we must be very prudent about selecting which initiatives to continue at this time.
While standard and open protocols are of value, it is the collapse of command and control at the edges of any network that is of most concern. It is evident that in Katrina, the call lists collapsed, that asset management is not interoperable, and that Federal officials relied on draft documents for policy, specifically NIMS and the NRP. They are sound plans for the future but not in place in any significant way.
Procurements for post 9/11 public safety systems still do not emphasize regional architectures beyond crime data collection enough. The OJP documents still emphasize fusion centers as collectors for criminal intelligence. Our post 9/11 emphasis on terrorism is delaying public safety initiatives to get open standards for dispatch-to-dispatch center communications implemented. We are obsessing over security systems while the EOCs languish.
Mobile dispatch systems are key but they too must interoperate regardless of the vendor.
The capability of failover to neighboring dispatch and EOC is primitive. The first responder and the sustaining responder mobile units do not operate to a regional design to enable neighboring centers to acquire these assets and provide them with support in case of failures of the originating agency systems.
First responder and sustaining responder mobile units are the edges of the network. Even if RF is used, the need for interoperability has not been addressed given the vertical application systems currently offered and the lack of national response protocols shared among state, local and tribal agencies. In effect, each State is a separate communications market.
DHS is properly working to implement standards for Internet technology and while I understand its importance, the buy cycle for public safety is about 12 years. We must not dangle promises that cannot be realized until the next generation systems are fielded and online. We absolutely must emphasize systems that work today, can be fielded sooner rather than later, and that do not beggar implementation when all that is required is open data formats.
The public safety industry and the standards groups must take a hard look at their initiatives, tighten up their requirements, and take a responsible look at what can be done in shorter timeframes. We must insist that standards created for non-mission-critical systems that do not fail given low performance and latency not be applied where performance and latency are critical (the case for verbosity in XML is that it does matter) or penalize the small city that cannot buy Tier 1 systems (MPEG4 is encumbered) because they are expensive solutions.
CAP and EDXL are a good start, but the solutions that will provide good results fast have yet to be seen in the standards community and will not be seen until the leaders of the public safety industry step up to the challenge of working with their competitors rather than pursuing disruptive competitive strategies. That is owed to the customers.
Katrina is the warning. It is not the last event. Nor can we continue to design, vend, and procure based solely on the last event. To future proof a design, simplify it, ensure it has both scale and reach and is robust in the face of failing infrastructure. Insist without backing down that when a public safety system is purchased, the vendor commits to thinking and working regionally regardless of which vendor has the contract for the public safety system in the next city, county, or state.
Think regionally.
Len Bullard (speaking only for myself and not my employer)
The article itself is confusing at best.
Seems that they are mixing the transport mechanism/layer, with the overall need for a common protocol.
Clearly you think of Radio as a voice only communication vector. It is not. Ever heard of Ham Radio operators running a packet switched data network?
If you can generate enough power, you can utilize this as a way to relay information from a disaster site, to others within and outside the disaster site. You can also utilize sites outside the disaster zone to bridge the network traffic to the internet.
Satellite Internet Access has its drawbacks, however its also an alternative.
But these are all issues of the transport mechanism.
If you think about it, there is no reason why you couldn't create a small device that would allow both voice and data over you're cleared spectrum.
The technology exists.
Its not rocket science...